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An Assessment of the Factors Affecting the Credit Quality of Private Power Developers  
by Scott Taylor 
 
ABSTRACT:  The trend toward privatization in the electric power industry both domestically and 
globally has lead to the emergence of private power project developing as a powerful industry.  The 
evaluation of the credit strength of developers is difficult given the uncertainty in how markets will 
develop and how deregulation will play out.  This paper discusses the regulatory environment that has 
led to the emergence of this industry, along with the typical capital structure of these firms.  The factors 
that go into rating firms in the industry as presented by Standard & Poor’s are then examined for any 
relationships between these factors and default probability.  Lastly, a theoretical framework for 
assessing the benefits of portfolio diversification given various levels of leverage and risk in the assets is 
presented. 
 
I. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
In the United States and globally, major segments of the electricity industry are being 
restructured.  In the U.S., the change began in 1978 with the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA), which made it possible for non-utility generators to enter the wholesale power market.  
Basically, PURPA required that electric utilities had to interconnect with and buy, at the utilities’ avoided 
cost, capacity and energy offered by any qualifying non-utility.  The aim of PURPA was to reduce the 
country’s dependence on foreign oil by encouraging the efficient use of fossil fuels through cogeneration 
and the use of renewable resources through small power producers.  Cogeneration consists of 
simultaneously producing electric energy and some other form of energy such as heat or steam using the 
same fuel source.  Renewable resources are energy sources that are regenerative or virtually 
inexhaustible such as solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, and hydroelectric.1  PURPA ensured that 
Qualifying Facilities (QFs) had a guaranteed market for their power at a price equal to the purchasers 
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Events,” January 2000. 
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avoided cost.  This differs from traditional regulation, which generally sets the price based upon the cost 
of producing it. 
In 1992, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) was signed into law.  This law made it easier 
for non-utility generators to enter the wholesale market for electricity by exempting them from 
constraints imposed by the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA).  EPACT created 
a new category of power producers called exempt wholesale generators (EWGs).  These differ from 
QFs in that they are not required to meet PURPA’s cogeneration or renewable resources requirements, 
and in that utilities are not required to purchase the power produced by these entities.  Marketing of the 
power produced by EWGs is facilitated by transmission provisions that have led to a nationwide open-
access electric power transmission grid for wholesale transactions.  Independent Power Producers, as 
well as other non-transmission owning entities, gained the ability to win orders requiring transmission 
owning entities to provide access to that transmission at “just and reasonable” rates.  In 1996, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued orders 888 and 889, requiring that shareholder 
owned utilities, which own about 75% of transmission capacity, open up transmission to all suppliers in 
the wholesale market.2 
 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT POWER DEVELOPER 
 The above-described regulatory changes have opened the door to non-regulated electricity 
producers entering the industry to compete with the traditional utilities.  Many of these companies are 
large, well-known international energy corporations.  Others are new firms that were started purely to 
                                                                 
2 Energy Information Administration, “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update”, December 
1996. 
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get into this business.  Non-utility producers’ nationwide share of generating capacity has grown from 
6% in 1990 to 12% at the end of 1998.  Non-utility capacity grew at an average annual rate of over 
10% from year-end 1990 to 1998, while utility capacity grew at a rate of less than 1% for the same 
period.  Since 1990, non-utility generators have contributed 46% of all new investment in electricity 
generation, and this does not include 25,000 megawatts of capacity which were divested by utilities and 
reclassified as non-utility.3 
 Many of today’s Independent Power Producers (IPPs) started out by owning and operating 
one or two PURPA QFs.  These facilities entered into long-term contracts with utilities at the utilities’ 
avoided costs.  The contracts were approved for recovery by the regulatory authority, and costs was 
passed on to ratepayers.  It is important to note that at the time of PURPA, oil prices were 
skyrocketing, and future avoided costs for utilities were estimated based on oil prices reaching as high 
as $100 per barrel.  Of course, oil prices never approached these levels, leaving the non-utility 
generators with contracts that locked in revenues well in excess of their expenses.  With the passage of 
EPACT, these excess cash flows could be reinvested in a much wider variety of competitive power 
projects.  Furthermore, deregulation is not a purely American phenomenon, but is proceeding at 
different rates worldwide, presenting international opportunities as well for IPPs.  With the cash flow 
projections based upon the PURPA contracts, IPPs were able to approach the capital markets to 
provide funding for new power projects. 
 Evaluation of the credit strength of IPPs (also referred to as “developers”) can be quite difficult, 
given that this is a new business in a market for which the development profile is very uncertain.  Several 
characteristics of developers can be analyzed with respect to risk.  These include, but are not limited to: 
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the level diversification of assets, the proportion of projects with 
contracted revenues, the sovereign risks of the countries where 
assets are held, credit support provided by a  
stronger parent company, and the amount of non-recourse debt 
used to finance individual projects.  While a number of developers 
have emerged, this paper will focus on the rated portfolio of 
developers.  This portfolio is presented in Table 1.  The goal is to 
present a profile of the credit strength of these developers, and to 
understand what factors play the most significant role in rating them. 
 
III. CREDITWORTHINESS OF DEVELOPERS 
A. Capital Structure Discussion 
A developer is essentially a parent level holding company that owns several power projects.  
Often the parent company is itself a subsidiary of a larger company.  The projects are typically highly 
levered (70-85% debt ratio).  Some project developers prefer to use non-recourse project level debt, 
while others do not.  The advantage for the company of non-recourse debt is that in the event of default, 
lenders can only look to the project itself for reparations.  The disadvantage of non-recourse debt is that 
lenders demand very strict covenants with regard to new investments and the distribution of cash to the 
parent level companies.  The remainder of the capital for the individual projects comes from “equity” 
contributed by the parent.  This equity comes predominantly from debt issued at the parent level, as well 
as true equity.  Some developers, especially those that are growing rapidly, have also issued convertible 
debt.  Therefore, cash generated by projects must service project level debt first, then satisfy any cash 
Table 1:  Portfolio of Rated  
Power Project Developers  
 
AES BB 
Cogentrix BB+ 
Calpine BB+ 
Edison Mission Energy A- 
MidAmerican BBB- 
NRG BBB- 
CSWE BBB 
CSWI BBB+ 
Southern Energy BBB 
USGEN BBB+ 
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traps or indentures at the project level, and then service parent level debt (sometimes multiple levels), 
before flowing to equity holders.  Because this is a new industry in its high growth stage, typically cash 
flows to equity are reinvested into new projects. 
 
B. Risk Criteria 
Given the multiple layers of debt, and the fact that the private power industry is in its infancy and 
is rapidly developing, it is difficult to assess the credit strength of developers with a high level of 
certainty.  Standard & Poor’s points to five general criteria when rating developers:4 
1) “Quality of Cash Flows” - an assessment of the credit strength of the individual projects; 
2) “Portfolio Cash Flow Characteristics” - a qualitative assessment of the portfolio effect 
gained by the diversification of the assets in the portfolio; 
3) “Financial Analysis” - an assessment of the financial strength of the developer based upon 
cash flow, capital structure and liquidity considerations; 
4) “Management and Ownership Structure” - an assessment of management’s strategies and 
track record; and 
5) “Credit for Parental Ownership” - an assessment of (if applicable) the strategic and financial 
importance of the developer to its parent company. 
 
 An attempt was made to understand the degree to which these criteria are encapsulated in the 
ratings by examining the ratings and characteristics of the various developers.  For each rating category, 
                                                                 
4 Standard & Poor’s, “Rating Criteria for Project Developers,” Infrastructure Finance Criteria and Commentary, 
October 1999. 
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a default probability was assigned based upon the Standard & Poor's data for cumulative 10-year 
defaults at various rating levels5  As proxies for “Quality of Cash Flows”, the percentages of projected 
cash flows coming from investment grade projects, from investment grade countries, and from U.S. 
based projects were obtained from various Standard & Poor's credit reports, as well as company 
annual reports and 10-K filings.  As a proxy for “Portfolio Cash Flow Characteristics”, the number of 
assets held by each entity was obtained from the same sources.  “Financial Analysis” information was 
based on various ratios, determined from the latest annual reports and 10-Ks of the companies.  No 
suitable proxy variable could be ascertained to describe “Management and Ownership Structure”.  A 
dummy variable was introduced for “Credit for Parental Ownership”, using 0 for those stand-alone 
companies and 1 for those companies that are subsidiaries of larger utilities.  The database can be found 
in Appendix A. 
 In observing the data, it becomes immediately obvious that parental support is an important 
factor in rating these entities.  Of the ten developers examined, seven had investment grade ratings, and 
all of these were subsidiaries of other companies.  The three speculative grade companies were stand-
alones.  Therefore, when examining the data, subsidiaries are plotted with different symbols from stand-
alones. 
 Next, financial data were observed.  Figures1a through 1d present graphs of default probability 
as a function of various capitalization and coverage ratios.6  Squares on the graphs represent stand-
alone companies while triangles represent subsidiaries.  Figure 1a displays the effect of the recourse 
debt to capitalization ratio.  Recourse debt represents that debt for which lenders can look to the parent 
                                                                 
5 Standard & Poor's Commentary, “Corporate Defaults Rise Sharply in 1998,” May 1999. 
6 Recall that default probability is assigned upon the firm’s Standard & Poor’s rating and the associated default 
frequency for that rating given in the Default Study. 
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company for reparations in an event of default.  We would expect that as recourse debt to capitalization 
increases, probability of default would increase.  In observing the graph, while the separation between 
subsidiaries and stand-alones is obvious, any trend in the data with respect to recourse debt to 
capitalization for either subset is virtually nonexistent.  However, a plot of total debt to capitalization in 
Figure 1b exhibits some evidence of an upward trend if all the data are observed together (i.e., not 
broken out by subsidiary and stand-alone. 
 Of course, capitalization ratios cannot be taken on their own as an indicator of credit strength.  
The strength of the investments as measured by funds from operation (FFO) coverage ratios are also 
important financial indicators.  We would expect that as coverages increase, probability of default would 
decrease.  Figure 1c displays FFO-Interest Coverage Ratio, while Figure 1d displays FFO-Debt 
Service Coverage ratio.  These plots reveal stronger trends than do the plots of capitalization ratios.  
Figure 1a:  Default Probability as a Function of
Recourse Debt to Capitalization Ratio
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Figure 1b:  Default Probability as a Function of
Total Debt to Capitalization Ratio
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Figure 1c:  Default Probability as a Function of
FFO-Interest Coverage Ratio
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Figure 1d:  Default Probability as a Function of
FFO-Debt Service Coverage Ratio
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The trend in FFO-Debt Service Coverage is much more obvious than FFO-Interest Coverage, 
especially when observing the subsets together.  A conclusion that can be drawn is that while parental 
support does in and of itself improve the creditworthiness of a developer, it is also true that the stand-
alones tend to have more debt in their capital structure and lower coverage ratios. 
 Factors other than financial ratios are considered when evaluating the credit strength of 
developers.  These factors are a little more difficult to quantify.  In fact, no attempt is made herein to 
quantify “Management and Ownership Structure”.  However, an attempt was made to quantify the 
“Quality of Cash Flows” and the “Portfolio Cash Flow Characteristics” based on the percentage of 
projects with investment grade characteristics7 and the total number of projects, respectively.  Figures 
2a and 2b display the default probability as a function of these two variables.  Given that investment 
grade projects represent higher quality cash flows, we would expect that as percentage of investment 
grade projects increase, probability of default would decrease.  Any relationship of the sort can not be 
observed in Figure 2a.  Also, if we assume that number of projects is a surrogate for portfolio 
diversification (which may be a stretch, given that all of a firm’s projects could be in one region or of 
similar type), we would expect that as the number of projects increases, probability of default would 
decrease.  Figure 2b shows no evidence of such a trend for the subsidiary companies, and the opposite 
appears true for the stand-alones.  The reason for this is that the lowest rated company (i.e., highest 
probability of default) is AES Corporation, which also happens to be the most diversified.  AES had 91 
separate operating assets as of its last year-end report.8  AES is represented by the upper right data 
                                                                 
7 The percentage of cash flows from projects in investment grade countries, as well as the percentage of projects in 
the U.S. were also considered, however these are not presented due to incomplete data. 
8 Based on AES' 1998 Annual Report.  It is recognized that AES currently has significantly more operating assets, 
however, for consistency all data is based upon year-end 1998 information- the latest readily available for the rated 
portfolio. 
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point in Figure 2b.  However, while AES’ portfolio diversification is high, the quality of its assets based 
upon the percentage of investment grade cash flows is low.  AES' stated mission is to help meet 
people’s electricity needs around the world.9  In executing this mission, AES operates a significant 
number of assets in developing nations such as Pakistan, Kazakhstan and other highly speculative 
sovereigns resulting in riskier projects.  The upper left data point in Figure 2a represents the quality of 
assets for AES. 
In observing the data herein, we have found that parent support provides the greatest influence 
on credit ratings for power project developers.  This is not surprising, given the fact that developers are 
operating in a new and highly uncertain environment.  The resources of a strong and stable parent 
company can go a long way in providing comfort to creditors.  Relationships between default probability 
and financial factors were also observed to a lesser degree (coverage ratios more so than capitalization 
ratios).  An attempt to quantify more qualitative factors such as quality of assets and diversification 
revealed no meaningful relationships. 
In observing trends in these latter two parameters, it became obvious that looking at each 
parameter individually cannot tell the whole story.  Rather, all parameters must be analyzed in concert.  
                                                                 
9 AES Annual report, 1998 
Figure 2a:  Default Probability as a Function of Percentage 
of "Investment Grade" Cash Flows
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Figure 2b:  Default Probability 
as a Function of Number of Projects
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Statistical techniques such as multiple regression can be used for such an exercise, however, given the 
small population of companies in the rated portfolio, a regression on a large number of parameters will 
tend not yield significant results.  An attempt was made to perform such a regression, and the closest to 
a significant relationship was found to be an equation relating default probability to parent support and 
FFO-Debt Service coverage.  The results of this regression are presented in Appendix B. 
 
III. PORTFOLIO EFFECT 
Markets tend to price bonds consistently with their ratings and this industry is no exception.  
Figure 3 displays the market yield to maturity for corporate level, non-callable bonds at the end of the 
month of February 2000 as obtained from Bloomberg.  As can be seen, the yield to maturity for bonds 
of these companies tends to increase with lower ratings.  Therefore, it is important that all factors be 
properly considered when undertaking credit analysis for these companies. 
One aspect of credit analysis that may 
not be given the weight it deserves is the 
portfolio diversification effect.  In order to 
make a complete assessment of the impact of 
diversification, it would be necessary to 
understand the average and variance of cash 
flows from each project, as well as their 
covariance.  Cash flows to the parent from 
individual projects is not information that developers readily disclose.  The following discussion presents 
a theoretical framework for understanding the power of diversification in a developer’s portfolio. 
Figure 3:  Yield to Maturity vs. Time to Maturity for 
Corporate Level, Non-Callable Developer Bonds
(End of February 2000)
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For simplification, assume that a development project will either distribute its expected excess 
cash, or it will default and distribute no cash.  In this case, the asset can be described by a binomial 
variable.  Further, assume that the asset is of BB credit quality, which corresponds to a default 
probability of approximately 15%10.  In this simple case of one asset, cash will either be distributed, 
covering corporate debt (85% chance), or it will not be distributed, resulting in corporate default (15% 
chance). 
Now consider a pool of equal-sized, independent assets whose total cash flow is projected to 
cover corporate level debt and expenses by 1.5 times.  For example, the pool could consist of two 
assets, each projected to provide cash flows of 0.75 times corporate level debt and expenses, or five 
assets, each projected to provide cash flows of 0.30 times corporate level debt and expenses.  In all 
cases, the expected cash flow will be 85% of 1.5 or 1.275.  However, the standard deviation of those 
cash flows will drop as the number of assets increases.  This is because assuming a normal 
approximation to the binomial variable, the standard deviation of a binomial variable is equal to 
)-1( pnpCF ; where CF is the cash flow per asset, n is the number of assets and p is the probability 
of successful distribution of cash flow.  When the number of assets increases in that equation, cash flow 
decreases proportionally.  However, the impact of cash flow is greater because the square root of 
number of assets is taken.  Obviously, the lower the standard deviation of the expected cash flows, the 
lower the probability that the cash flow to the developer will fall below 1.0, resulting in corporate level 
default. 
Table 2 displays the expected cash flow, standard deviation of the expected cash flow and 
probability of cash flow falling below 1.0 (i.e., probability of default) for various pools of equal-sized, 
                                                                 
10 Standard & Poor’s Commentary, “Corporate Defaults Rise Sharply in 1998,” May 1999 
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independent assets.  The calculation in the table assumes that if all projects distribute cash, the corporate 
level coverage would be 1.5 times.  As can be seen from the Table, the probability of default drops 
significantly as the number of assets increases.  The probability of default for a two asset portfolio is 
23.4%, which corresponds to approximately a B+ rating, while a 20 asset portfolio has a probability of 
default of 2.3%, corresponding to approximately a AA- rating. 
 
Table 2 
Probability of Corporate Level Default Given  
Various Pools of BB Quality Assets (i.e., Default Probability of 15%) 
 
 
Number of Projects 
 
Cash Flow per 
Project 
 
Expected Total 
Cash Flow given 
Quality of Assets 
Standard Deviation 
of Cash Flow given 
Quality of Assets 
 
Probability of 
Corporate Level 
Default 
2 0.75 1.275 0.379 23.4% 
3 0.50 1.275 0.309 18.7% 
5 0.30 1.275 0.240 12.5% 
7 0.21 1.275 0.202 8.7% 
10 0.15 1.275 0.169 5.2% 
15 0.10 1.275 0.138 2.3% 
20 0.08 1.275 0.120 1.1% 
 
Of course, this could not be directly applied across the board for developers.  The variation in 
cash flow size and quality across the pool of assets as well as the correlation between the cash flows on 
the various assets would have to be examined on a case by case basis.  Such information is typically not 
disclosed by developers, but developers can, and probably do, use such information to understand the 
characteristics of their own investment portfolio.  However, this analysis does reveal some interesting 
characteristics of the benefits of diversification with respect to credit quality discussed below. 
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Figure 4 displays the 
calculated probability of default vs. the 
number of assets for various projected 
debt service coverage ratios (DSCR).  
The results in Table 2 for a 1.5x 
DSCR are represented by the middle 
line in the Figure while the top and 
bottom lines represent 1.2x and 1.8x DSCR, respectively.  As would be expected, lower parent level 
DSCR (which implies higher leverage), leads to higher probability of default for the parent level debt.  
As can be seen, the drop in default probability as the number of assets is increased is not nearly as great 
for a company with 1.2x projected coverage as it is for a company with 1.5x or 1.8x DSCR.  The 
conclusion from this exercise is that the benefits of diversification are not as great for those highly 
leveraged developers. 
Figure 5 displays the probability of default vs. the number of assets for various projected 
qualities of assets as described by a 
debt rating.  The results in Table 2 for 
a portfolio of BB assets are 
represented by the second line from 
the bottom in the Figure.  Note that all 
other factors were held constant.  As 
would be expected, lower rated (i.e., 
Figure 4:  Probability of Default vs. Number of Assets 
(Varying Projected DSCR)
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Figure 5:  Probability of Default vs. Number of Assets 
(Varying Project Credit Quality)
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lower quality assets) result in higher parent level default probability.  As can be seen, the drop in default 
probability as the number of  assets increases is not nearly as great for a company with B- quality assets 
(i.e., lower quality assets), as it is for the other firms with higher quality assets.  The conclusion from this 
exercise is that, as with more highly leveraged developers, the benefits of diversification are not as great 
for a developers which hold lower quality assets.  This is consistent with the observation of the 
developer data where it was observed that AES, although more diversified, was still judged to have a 
higher probability of default due to its riskier assets. 
 The above exercise should serve as a guideline in assessing credit quality, and should serve to 
help developers understand the kinds of benefits they should expect from a diversified portfolio.  It 
should be noted that this exercise assumed completely uncorrellated asset cash flows, and would change 
accordingly if cash flows from assets were found to be positively or negatively correlated. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this study, an attempt was made to understand trends in credit quality for the emerging private 
power business.  Specifically, the rated portfolio of ten power project developers was examined for 
trends in credit quality.  The data revealed that credit for parental ownership was the strongest 
determinant of credit quality, while some trends were also observed with financial variables.  Proxies for 
diversification and asset risk revealed no noticeable relationships.  Multiple regression analyses revealed 
significant relationships between default probability and parental ownership as well as FFO-Interest 
Coverage Ratio.  A theoretical approach to assessing the benefits of diversification revealed that such 
benefits are much smaller for those developers holding riskier assets or with higher leverage.
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Appendix A:  Data Used for Credit Quality Analyses 
 
            
 
Company 
 
AES 
 
Cogentrix 
 
Calpine 
Edison 
Mission 
Mid-
American 
 
NRG 
 
CSWE 
 
CSWI 
Southern 
Energy 
 
USGEN 
average 
(St. Dev.) 
 
Rating 
 
BB 
 
BB+ 
 
BB+ 
 
A- 
 
BBB- 
 
BBB- 
 
BBB 
 
BBB+ 
 
BBB 
 
BBB+ 
Not 
Applicable 
Recourse Debt to 
Capitalization Ratio 
 
0.226 
 
0.256 
 
0.701 
 
0.089 
 
0.403 
 
0.349 
 
0.758 
 
0.538 
 
0.204 
 
0.259 
0.378 
(0.221) 
Total Debt to 
Capitalization Ratio 
 
0.740 
 
0.892 
 
0.789 
 
0.698 
 
0.874 
 
0.459 
 
0.758 
 
0.538 
 
0.728 
 
0.688 
0.716 
(0.135 
 
Recourse Debt to 
Total Debt Ratio 
 
0.306 
 
0.287 
 
0.888 
 
0.128 
 
0.461 
 
0.761 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
0.280 
 
0.377 
 
0.549 
(0.330) 
 
FFO-Interest 
Coverage Ratio 
 
1.78 
 
2.17 
 
2.45 
 
2.30 
 
2.16 
 
1.14 
 
1.38 
 
2.53 
 
1.46 
 
5.63 
 
2.30 
(1.26) 
 
FFO-Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio 
 
0.74 
 
0.60 
 
0.85 
 
1.64 
 
1.00 
 
0.80 
 
1.38 
 
2.31 
 
0.78 
 
1.51 
 
1.16 
(0.54) 
 
Parent 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Not 
Applicable 
 
Number of  Projects 
 
91 
 
26 
 
38 
 
73 
 
30 
 
59 
 
7 
 
4 
 
16 
 
39 
 
38 
(28) 
Percent CF From 
Investment Grade 
Projects 
 
17 
 
75 
 
70 
 
73 
 
68 
 
56 
 
0 
 
64 
 
50 
 
30 
 
50 
(26) 
Percent CF From 
Investment Grade 
Sovereigns 
 
70 
 
100 
 
100 
 
95 
 
Not 
Available 
 
86 
 
100 
 
64 
 
Not 
Available 
 
100 
 
72 
(40) 
Percent CF From 
U.S. Based Projects 
 
47 
 
100 
 
100 
 
60 
 
Not 
Available 
 
62 
 
100 
 
0 
 
Not 
Available 
 
100 
 
57 
(44) 
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APPENDIX B:  Multiple regression analysis between log(default ratio) and the two variables FFO-Debt Service Coverage and the dummy 
variable of 1 being a subsidiary company and 0 being a stand-alone. 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
 
The regression equation is 
logdef = 1.24 - 0.205 FFODSCov - 0.414 parent 
 
Predictor        Coef       StDev          T        P 
Constant       1.2450      0.1087      11.45    0.000 
FFODSCov     -0.20527     0.09236      -2.22    0.057 
parent        -0.4140      0.1099      -3.77    0.005 
 
S = 0.1474      R-Sq = 79.9%     R-Sq(adj) = 74.8% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source            DF          SS          MS         F        P 
Regression         2     0.68921     0.34461     15.87    0.002 
Residual Error     8     0.17371     0.02171 
Total             10     0.86293 
 
logdef = log10 Default Probability 
FFODSCov = FFO-Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
Parent = dummy variable for parental ownership - 1 for a subsidiary and 0 for a stand-alone 
